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ACTION SS 70

INFO /070 W

R 140830Z SEP 67
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6842
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 4242
CINCPAC FOR POLAD
AMCONSUL DANANG 960
AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE 2526

EXCISE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR
REVIEWED BY [redacted] DATE 12/24/81
PORTIONS DENIED AS INDICATED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SAIGON 5933

LIMDIS

REF : A) SAIGON 5646
B) SAIGON 4939

FILED BY NSA

1. EVENING SEPTEMBER 13 [redacted] REITERATED HIS BELIEF THAT, AS OF NOW, MAJORITY OF ASSEMBLY WOULD VOTE TO INVALIDATE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION. [redacted] BELIEVES

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ASSEMBLY SPECIAL COMMITTEE [redacted] WILL UNCOVER EVIDENCE PROVING THAT THERE WAS WIDESPREAD CHEATING. HE INDICATED, HOWEVER, THAT DEPUTIES' DECISION ON PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION MAY BE INFLUENCED BY "MANY DIFFERENT MOTIVATIONS" AS MUCH
AS BY OBJECTIVE EVIDENCE. ONE SUCH MOTIVATION WOULD BE FEELING THAT UPPER HOUSE WENT TO THIEU MEN IN AN ELECTION OF DUBIOUS HONESTY. [redacted] ALSO SAID THAT BLOCS IN ASSEMBLY HAVE NOT TAKEN FIRM POSITIONS ON HONESTY OF ELECTION, AND WOULD AWAIT WITH

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INTEREST INFORMATION ON COMPOSITION OF NEW GOVERNMENT.

2. EMBOFFS EMPHASIZED THAT ASSEMBLY SHOULD JUDGE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION ON BASIS OF FACTS, AND NOT BECAUSE THEIR SIDE WON OR LOST IN PRESIDENTIAL AND UPPER HOUSE CONTESTS. [redacted] SAID HE INTENDED TO TAKE AN OBJECTIVE LOOK AT EVIDENCE, WHICH WAS WHY HE VOLUNTEERED TO JOIN SPECIAL COMMITTEE. AT ONE POINT HE ADMITTED THAT DISCREPANCIES NOTED THUS FAR IN VOTE TALLIES WOULD AFFECT LESS THAN 100,000 VOTES, (OUT OF TOTAL VOTE OF ALMOST 4.9 MILLION) NOT ENOUGH TO HAVE INFLUENCED OUTCOME OF THE ELECTION.

3. [redacted] SAID THAT ALTHOUGH HE SAW PRIME MINISTER KY FREQUENTLY BEFORE THE ELECTION, HE HAS NOT TALKED TO HIM SINCE SEPTEMBER 3.

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HE EXPRESSED VIEW THAT THIEU AND KY SHOULD NEGOTIATE THEIR DIFFERENCES, BUT HAD NO WAY OF KNOWING WHETHER THEY ARE DOING SO.

4. IN SEPARATE CONVERSATION WITH EMBOFFS SEPTEMBER 13, DOCTOR PHAN QUANG DAN WENT OVER MUCH OF SAME GROUND OF SEPTEMBER 5 CONVERSATION (REF B). DAN REMAINS CONCERNED THAT ASSEMBLY MIGHT INVALIDATE ELECTION. HE SAID HE BELIEVED MILITANT BUDDHISTS BECOMING RESTIVE, POSSIBLY WITH ENCOURAGEMENT FROM PRIME MINISTER KY; AND HE FORESAW POSSIBILITY OF SERIOUS POLITICAL CRISIS, IF THIEU AND KY RELATIONSHIPS DETERIORATE ANY FURTHER. DAN SAID ONE WAY TO SMOOTH OVER DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO GENERALS WOULD BE FOR THIEU TO APPOINT KY'S MAN, NGUYEN VAN LOC, PRIME MINISTER. IN REALITY, DAN ARGUED, THIS WOULD BE SMALL CONCESSION TO KY SINCE UNDER NEW CONSTITUTION PRESIDENT, NOT PM, HOLDS REAL EXECUTIVE POWER AND THIEU COULD ALWAYS RELIEVE LOC AT SOME LATER DATE WHEN POLITICAL TENSIONS HAVE SUBSIDED. DAN ALSO MADE POINT THAT THIEU SHOULD BEGIN TO DEAL DIRECTLY WITH ASSEMBLY IN ORDER TO INSURE HIS VALIDATION RATHER THAN RELYING ON KY.

5. COMMENT: A) [redacted] ATTITUDE IS PROBABLY SIMILAR TO THOSE OF OTHER DEFEATED DEMOCRATIC-ALLIANCE DEPUTIES. PARTICULARLY

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IN FEELING THAT UPPER HOUSE ELECTION WAS SOMEHOW RIGGED IN THIEU'S FAVOR.

B). APPOINTMENT OF LOC AS PRIME MINISTER, AS DR. DAN SUGGESTS, MIGHT HAVE EFFECT OF SMOOTHING OVER DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THIEU AND KY IN THE SHORT TERM; SUCH AN APPOINTMENT, HOWEVER, COULD COMPLIATE RATHER THAN SIMPLIFY MORE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE AT STAKE WHICH IS THIEU'S ABILITY TO BECOME EFFECTIVE CHIEF EXECUTIVE.

GP-3. BUNKER